CUBA

- I. Fidel Castro's rapid concentration of Cuba's political and economic sources of control in the hands of a radical and authoritarian clique has been marked by deep and increasing Communist influences.
 - A. He has flaunted his willingness to deal with both Cuban Communists and the Sino-Soviet bloc, regarding them as helpful allies in achieving his aims.
 - B. Communists are deeply involved in the remodeling of Cuba.
 - C. Cuba has become a base for communism in Latin America.
- II. We are unable to answer the question: "Is Fidel Castro a Communist?"
 - A. Given the common interests of Castro and the Cuban Communists, it is difficult, and in most respects academic, to try to distinguish the policies of the Castro regime from those which would be expected of a government under actual Communist control.
 - B. If present trends continue, the Communists will gain de facto control of the Castro regime, and are near this point now.
- III. Although there is a growing number of Cubans who oppose the regime, they are confused and intimidated.
 - A. They now include moderates who were early Castro supporters.
 - B. They fear the regime's internal political intelligence network.
 - C. The Church, as such, remains inactive, though individual churchmen have publicly criticized Communist influence.
- IV. The regime's moves in every field demonstrate a determination rapidly to reorganize all Cubans into tightly knit groups under close government control.

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- A. The National Agrarian Reform Institute, headed by Nunez

 Jimenez (Noon-yes Him-ain-es), almost certainly a Communist, is

 probably the most powerful example of this pervasive control.
- V. The economic situation, although deteriorating in some sectors, has temporarily improved in others. This is in great part due to prompt bloc economic assistance, land and business expropriations, and expanding foodstuff production.
 - A. The economy will probably not cause serious political problems during 1960, but the outlook for private ownership remains dismal.
- VI. Castro has implemented successfully his violently anti-US economic and political policies.
 - A. His officials acted swiftly to ensure Cuba's petroleum supply meet his demands to retine Sorie teroleum when Western oil companies did not experses and almost

certainly will seize Western refineries.

B. He is continuing his vitribilic anti-American propagate.

VII. Most Latin American governments are concerned over Cuban meddling in their affairs and oppose Castro's methods, but they hesitate to criticize his regime openly because of his popularity among some

politically important groups.

- VIII.Cuba's political and economic ties with the Sino-Soviet bloc have fast become the basis of Castro's foreign relations.
 - A. So far, relations with the USSR, Czechoslovakia and Poland have been announced. Others, including Communist China, may follow.
 - B. Cuba will probably collaborate with the USSR in the UN on certain issues, including that of membership for Peiping.

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- C. Trade and assistance agreements have been signed with the USSR, Czechoslovakia, Poland, and East Germany. More are in prospect.
- D. Castro and Khrushchev may be working out arrangements for an exchange of visits, but no dates have been set publicly.
- E. Communist China is making a greater play for Cuba than for any other Latin American country.
- IX. The Soviet Embassy in Cuba may play an important role in Soviet espionage.

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X. There is no firm evidence that military agreements have been

concluded with the Bloc, but the possibility remains that the

bloc has agreed to provide Cuba with some military equipment.